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Abstract: 
In flight operations, pilots are confronted with many problems that occur in continually changing 
situations that create a level of stress and lead to accidents.  To make rapid decisions, pilots make 
decisions using a holistic process involving situation recognition and pattern matching. This research 
investigated 157 pilots from a B747 fleet to find out how pilots make in-flight decision in such stressful 
situations.  The research method is based upon evaluating the situational awareness, risk management, 
response time and applicability of four different decision-making mnemonics in six in-flight scenarios.  
The data obtained in this research suggests that the FOR-DEC may be suitable as a basis for providing 
training which will be applicable for covering all basic types of decision.  FOR-DEC was evaluated as 
the most applicable mnemonic-based decision making process across the six different scenarios used.  
It also had significantly superior performance compared with the other three mnemonic-based methods 
evaluated (SHOR, PASS & DESIDE) when making recognition-primed decisions, response selection 
decisions, non-diagnostic procedural decisions, and problem-solving decisions. 
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Introduction 
 
The advent of improved accident investigation technology in recent years, such as cockpit voice 
recorders, along with a more systematic review of accident statistics, has produced a growing 
realization of the significance role of pilot judgment errors in flight operations (Buch and Diehl, 1984). 
Jensen and Benel (1977) found that decision errors contributed to 35% of all nonfatal and 52% of all 
fatal general aviation accidents in the United States.  Diehl (1991) proposed that decision errors 
contributed to 56% of airline accidents and 53% of military accidents. Furthermore, Li and Harris 
(2008) suggested that 69% of accidents were relevant to pilots’ in-flight decision errors. O'Hare (2003) 
reviewed aeronautical decision-making and came to the conclusion that 'it is difficult to think of any 
single topic that is more central to the question of effective human performance in aviation than that of 
decision-making'.  Current FAA regulations require that decision-making be taught as part of the 
pilot-training curriculum (FAA, 1991), however, little guidance is provided as to how that might be 
accomplished, and none is given as to how it might be measured, outside of the practical test. 
 
Aeronautical knowledge, skill, and judgment have always been regarded as the three basic faculties that 
pilots must possess.  The requisite aeronautical knowledge and operating skills have been imparted in 
flight training programs and have subsequently been evaluated as part of the pilot certification process.  
In contrast, judgment has usually been considered to be a trait that good pilots innately possess or an 
ability that is acquired as a by-product of flying experience. A decision bias is not a lack of knowledge, 
a false belief about the facts, or an inappropriate goal, nor does it necessarily involve lapses of attention, 
motivation, or memory.  Rather, a decision bias is a systematic flaw in the internal relationship among 
a person's judgments, desires, and choices.  Human reasoning depends, under most conditions, on 
heuristic procedures and representation that predictably lead to such inconsistencies.  It follows that 
human reasoning processes are error prone by their very nature (Cohen, 1993). Although a great deal of 
research has demonstrated that decision making is a primary component of pilot performance, this 
concern has not translated well into systematic training programs.  Aviation specialists have suggested 
that rational judgment is a function of both motivation and information processing.  Another approach 
to improving pilot decision making is the use of prescriptive aids such as the ARTFUL decision tree 
(O'Hare, 1992).  However, using these assumes that sufficient time exists to proceed through a 
prescribed decision making checklist.  
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Time pressure has several obvious but important implications for decision-making.  Firstly, decision 
makers will often experience high levels of stress, with the potential for exhaustion and loss of 
vigilance; secondly, their thinking will shift, characteristically in the direction of using less complicated 
reasoning strategies (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988).  Stiensmeier-Pelster & Schurmann (1993) 
indicated that time stress may affect the process of decision making in a variety of ways depending on 
the type of decision.  It may lead to reallocation of cognitive resources from the decision process to 
the stress coping process.  Time stress may also change the goals of the decision-making process. 
Under time stress, cognitive resources may be allocated from the decision-making process to 
monitoring of the flow of time as part of a coping strategy (Zakay, 1993).  Klein & Thordsen (1991) 
observed that decision makers in difficult situations and under time stress did not appear to use the 
classical approach to make decisions, even when they were trained in that approach.  Much of the 
research on qualitative changes in cognitive performance, when stressors such as time pressure are 
present, is broadly consistent with the conflict theory of decision making proposed by Janis and Mann 
(1977).  Edland & Svenson (1993) found that under time pressure the following changes were 
observed in the decision-making processes: (1) an increased selectivity of input of information; (2) 
attributes perceived to be more important were given more weight under time pressure than in 
situations with no time pressure; (3) the accuracy of human judgment decreases; (4) the use of 
non-compensatory decision rules becomes more frequent than compensatory rules requiring value 
tradeoffs; (5) there is a decrease in the ability to find alternative problem-solving strategies; (6) 
motivation is attenuated. 
 
Benson and Beach (1996) found that time pressure made the screening phase of problem identification 
less systematic.  Unsystematic identification and screening processes can also occur in decisions 
concerned with ill-defined problems.  The quality of decision-making may suffer even more from 
time stress in this case.  Keinan (1987) found that under stress the range of alternatives and 
dimensions that are considered during a decision-making process is significantly restricted, compared 
with normal conditions.  In brief, the effects of time stress on decision making are: (1) a reduction in 
information search and processing; (2) increased importance of negative information; (3) defensive 
reactions increase, such as neglect or denial of important information; (4) bolstering of the chosen 
alternative occurs; (5) forgetting important data happens; (6) poor judgments and evaluation are more 
likely; (7) there is a tendency to use a strategy of information filtration.  Information that is perceived 
as being the most important is processed first, and then processing is continued until time is up.   
 
The processes of decision-making center around two elements; situation assessment, which is used as a 
pre-cursor to generate a plausible course of action, and mental simulation to evaluate that course of 
action for risk management (Endsley, 1993).  If a pilot recognizes there is sufficient time for making 
wide-ranging considerations, s/he will evaluate the dominant response option by conducting a mental 
simulation to see if it is likely to work.  If there is not adequate time, the pilot will tend to implement 
the course of action that experience (if any) dictates is the most likely to be successful. Klein (1993) 
found that whereas experts used a recognition-primed or perception-based decision process to retrieve a 
single likely option, novices were more likely to use an analytical approach, systematically comparing 
multiple options, and experience affects the processes of decision-making by improving the accuracy of 
situation assessment, increasing the quality of the courses of action considered and by enabling the 
decision maker to construct a mental simulation. Furthermore, Endsley (1997) defines situation 
awareness (SA) as ‘the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the future’.  In a 
dynamic tactical environment, effective decision-making is highly dependent on situation awareness 
which has been identified as a critical decision component (Endsley & Bolstad, 1994).  Situation 
assessment is the process by which the state of situation awareness is achieved and is a fundamental 
precursor to situation awareness, which is itself the precursor for all aspects of decision-making 
( Prince & Salas, 1997).   
 
Automated aids in aviation industry are designed specifically to decrease pilots’ workload by 
performing many cognitive tasks, not only including information processing, system monitoring, 
diagnosis and prediction, but also controlling the physical placement of the aircraft.  Flight 
management systems (FMS) are designed not only to keep the aircraft on course, but also to assume 
increasing control of cognitive flight tasks, such as calculating fuel-efficient routes, navigating, or 
detecting and diagnosing system malfunctions.  An inevitable facet of these automated aids is that 
they change the way pilots perform tasks and make decisions.  However, the presence of automated 
cues also diminishes the likelihood that decision makers will make the cognitive effort to process all 
available information in cognitively complex ways.  Parasuraman and Riley (1997) describe this 
tendency toward over-reliance as 'automation misuse'.  In addition, automated cues increase the 
probability that decision makers will cut off situation assessment prematurely when prompted to take a 
course of action by automated aids.  Automation commission errors are errors made when decision 
makers inappropriately follow automated information or directives (e.g., when other information in the 
environment contradicts or is inconsistent with the automated cue).  These errors have recently begun 
surfacing as by-products of automated systems.  Experimental evidence of automation-induced 
commission errors has also been provided by full-mission simulations in the NASA Ames Advanced 
Concepts Flight Simulator (Mosier, Skitka, Heers and Burdick, 1998). 
 
Orasanu and Fisher (1997) investigated the five highest performance pilots and the five lowest 
performance pilots in a flight simulation study, and found a tendency for high performance pilots to be 
more likely to use low workload situations to make plans and collect more relevant information 
compared with the poorer performing pilots.  High performance pilots also demonstrated greater 
situation awareness.   
 
 
Method 
 
Participants:  
There were 157 pilots participated in this research, consisting of 57 captains and 99 first officers.  
Data was missing for one participant.  The full demographic data collected including teaching 
experience, flying hours, and training background is presented in Table 1). 
 
Four Aeronautical Decision-making Mnemonics:  
The SHOR mnemonic (Wohl, 1981) consists of four steps: Stimuli, Hypotheses, Options, and 
Response.  It was originally developed for use by U.S. Air Force tactical command and control, where 
decisions were required under high pressure and severe time constraint.  In this situation, decisions 
require near-real-time reactions involving threat warning, task rescheduling and other types of dynamic 
modification.  The SHOR methodology is basically an extension of the stimulus-response paradigm of 
classical behavioral psychology developed to deal with two aspects of uncertainty in the 
decision-making process, information input uncertainty followed by the evaluation of the consequences 
of actions, which creates the requirement for option generation and evaluation.  
The PASS methodology was originally developed by a civil airline (Delta) to train pilots as part of a 
CRM training program.  It consists of four steps: Problem identification (define/redefine problems); 
Acquire information (seek more information); Survey strategy (survey/resurvey strategies); Select 
strategy (Maher, 1989).  After the selection of a solution strategy, if the problem is not solved, then 
the pilot should re-enter the problem solving loop once more. 
The FOR-DEC mnemonic comprises of six steps: Facts, Options, Risks & Benefits, Decision, 
Execution, Check (Hormann, 1995).  It incorporates an analysis of risk and benefits when handling 
in-flight situations, including assessing the effects of time pressure, continually changing conditions, 
distraction, and having incomplete information.   
The DESIDE (Murray, 1997) was developed on a sample of South African pilots and comprises of six 
steps: Detect, Estimate, Set safety objectives, Identify, Do, Evaluate.  The DESIDE method is a 
practical application to aid pilots in making in-flight decisions adapted from conflict-theory model of 
Janis and Mann (1977). 
 
The Development of Six In-flight Scenarios:  
To develop scenarios for assessing the effectiveness of the ADM mnemonics which corresponded to 
Orasanu’s (1993) six generic decision making categories, six focus groups were conducted, one for 
each scenario.  Each focus group comprised two human factors specialists, three senior B-747 
instructor pilots and the director of Crew Resource Management Departments of the participating 
airlines.  The purpose of these focus groups was to  ensure enough detailed information for pilots 
was included to enable them to make a decision and hence to evaluate the performance of  the four 
ADM mnemonics. These six scenarios developed were as follows. 
 
Go/no go decisions: A Boeing 747-400 departed from Taipei to Los Angeles, take-off weight 833,000 
pounds. The warning light of 4L door suddenly illuminated while the aircraft was taking off from 
Taoyuan Airport runway 05 with an indicated air speed of 120 kt.……  
 
Recognition-primed decisions: A Boeing 747-400 departed from Los Angeles to Taipei with landing 
weight 533,000 pounds. The aircraft planed to land at Taoyuan Airport runway 06, visibility 3,000 
meters, cloud base 500 feet. Auto pilot engaged during instrument approach, ILS signal is suffering 
interference  and Glide Slope indication is fluctuating……   
 
Response selection decisions: A Boeing 747-400 departed from Hong Kong to Taipei, and planned to 
land at Taoyuan Airport runway 05 with landing weight 533,000 pounds. The ATC cleared “Direct to 
TONGA, descend and maintain flight level 290, clear to JAMMY via TONGA 3A RNAV ARRIVAL”. 
When aircraft is 3 miles from TONGA, communication was is lost, and there is a failure to contact 
ATC……   
 
Resource management decisions: A Boeing 747-400 departed from Hong Kong to Taipei, and planed 
to land at Taoyuan Airport runway 05 with landing weight 533,000 pounds. ATC cleared “Direct to 
TONGA”; descend and maintain 11,000 feet; clear to JAMMY via “TONGA 3A RNAV ARRIVAL”. 
3 miles before BRAVO, the Captain (PF) suddenly became incapacitated, and provided no response to 
standard CALL OUT twice …… 
 
Non-diagnostic procedural decisions: A Boeing 747-400 departed from Taipei to Los Angeles, from 
Taoyuan Airport runway 05 with take-off weight 833,000 pounds at 22:30 local time. When climbing 
to 1,000 feet with Thrust Reduced to CLB, the aircraft suddenly began to vibrate significantly. PM 
found No.1 ENG vibration indication abnormal, although other ENG indications were normal. By this 
time the aircraft has cross through a cloudy area with light turbulence. It was difficult to judge whether 
vibration caused by ENG or turbulence; it was unclear whether to continue to destination airport or 
return to base…… 
 
Problem-solving decisions: A Boeing 747-400 departed from Taipei to Los Angeles, from Taoyuan 
Airport runway 05 with take-off weight 833,000 pounds. During the climb through 1,000 feet after 
departure, the fire warning system of No.4 ENG was activated, 10 seconds later, the aircraft began to 
vibrate heavily and a big “BANG” was heard.  The relevant No.4 ENG systems failed totally, and the 
fire warning disappeared..... 
 
ADM Evaluation Instruments 
To develop a rating instrument for the subsequent evaluation of the suitability of the four ADM 
mnemonic-based methods in the six in-flight scenarios, six focus groups were formed, one for each 
scenario.  Each comprised two human factors specialists and three B-747 instructor pilots. The six 
selected scenarios were analyzed by the focus group members using all four mnemonic methods.  This 
process provided the material for the construction of a rating form to evaluate the suitability of the 
ADM mnemonics for decision-making training. The narrative responses describing the 
decision-making process by which the participants would arrive at their decision was evaluated using 
the criteria of situation assessment, risk management, response time and applicability. 
 
Administration of Evaluation Forms  
As a result of the length of the scenarios and the number of ratings required, each participant only 
evaluated the ADM decision techniques in three scenarios, either scenarios 1, 3 & 5 or scenarios 2, 4 & 
6. The ADM rating forms were distributed to all pilots of B-747 fleet of the participating airlines.  
Completed instruments were returned to the Crew Resource Management Department. For each 
participant an overall score for each mnemonic method in each scenario was created by summing the 
scores across four dimensions of situation assessment; risk management; response time; and 
applicability giving a potential range of scales between 4 (low suitability) to 36 (high suitability).   
 
 
RESULTS  
Sample Characteristics 
In total, data were collected from 1,871 evaluations of scenarios.  There were 312 completed rating 
forms for the go/no go decisions scenario; 311 for the recognition-primed decision-making scenario; 
316 for the response selection decision-making scenario; 310 for the resource management scenario; 
312 for the non-diagnostic procedural decisions-making scenario, and 310 completed rating forms for 
the creative problem-solving scenario (Table 2). 
 
Table 1  Demographic data from Participants 
 
Demography Category Frequenc
y 
Percentage 
Captain 57 36.3％ 
First officer 99 63.1％ 
Missing data 1 .6％ 
Job 
description 
total 157 100.0％ 
Male 151 96.2％ 
Female 5 3.2％ 
Missing data 1 .6％ 
Gender 
Total 157 100.0％ 
30 or under 7 4.5％ 
31-40 68 43.3％ 
41-50 54 34.4％ 
51 or above 26 16.6％ 
Missing data 2 1.3％ 
Age 
Total 155 100.0％ 
Ab-initio 74 47.1％ 
CPL 23 14.6％ 
Ex-military 48 30.6％ 
Other 11 7.0％ 
Missing data 1 .6％ 
Training 
background 
Total  157 100.0％ 
Less than 2000 hrs 9 5.7％ 
2001-5000hrs 42 26.8％ 
5001-10000hrs 53 33.8％ 
10000hrs and above 51 32.5％ 
Missing data 2 1.3％ 
Flying hours 
Total 157 100.0％ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 The Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for four Different Mnemonics decision-making methods 
in each of the Six Scenarios.  
Item N M SD 
Scenario 1 SHOR 79 6.67 1.39 
Scenario 1 PASS 78 6.42 1.63 
Scenario 1 FORDEC 77 6.83 1.67 
Scenario 1 DESIDE 78 6.43 1.51 
Scenario 2 SHOR 78 6.41 1.56 
Scenario 2 PASS 78 6.59 1.25 
Scenario 2 FORDEC  77 6.99 1.30 
Scenario 2 DESIDE  78 6.75 1.27 
Scenario 3 SHOR 79 6.59 1.14 
Scenario 3 PASS 79 6.81 1.03 
Scenario 3 FORDEC  79 7.43 1.10 
Scenario 3 DESIDE  79 6.99 1.21 
Scenario 4 SHOR 77 6.83 1.47 
Scenario 4 PASS 77 6.67 1.27 
Scenario 4 FORDEC  78 7.11 1.41 
Scenario 4 DESIDE  78 6.91 1.40 
Scenario 5 SHOR 78 6.47 1.31 
Scenario 5 PASS 78 6.72 1.11 
Scenario 5 FORDEC  78 7.50 1.14 
Scenario 5 DESIDE  78 7.08 1.09 
Scenario 6 SHOR 77 6.81 1.46 
Scenario 6 PASS 78 6.73 1.25 
Scenario 6 FORDEC  77 7.20 1.33 
Scenario 6 DESIDE  78 6.94 1.19 
 
Scenario 1: Go/no go Decisions  
The highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics in the go/no go decision-making 
scenario by participants was FORDEC followed by SHOR, DESIDE, and PASS (Table 2).  There 
were no significant differences in the ratings of suitability among the four ADM mnemonics (F=2.192, 
P>.05) in table 3.  
 
  Table 3: One‐way ANOVA table for Go/no go scenario broken down by 
  the four different ADM mnemonics 
Source  SS  DF  MS  F  P  Post‐Hoc
SStr 8.963  2.243  3.997  2.192  .108 
SSb 430.394  76  5.663  3.106  .045 
SSE 310.694  170.430  1.823     
SST 750.051  248.673  11.483     
NS 
Scenario 2: Recognition-primed Decision  
The highest overall rating of the suitability for the ADM mnemonics by participants was for FOR-DEC 
followed by DESIDE, PASS, and SHOR (Table 2).  There were significant differences among the 
rated overall suitability of the four ADM mnemonics in this scenario (F=5.22, P<.007).  Further 
comparisons using post-hoc t-tests showed significant differences between FOR-DEC (M=6.99, 
SD=1.30) vs SHOR (M=6.41, SD=1.56); and FOR-DEC (M=6.99, SD=1.30) vs PASS (M=6.59, 
SD=1.25) in table 4. 
 
Table 4: One‐way ANOVA table for Recognition‐primed scenario broken down by 
  the four different ADM mnemonics 
Source  SS  DF  MS  F  P  Post‐Hoc 
SStr 13.116  1.962  6.684  5.223  .007 
SSb 365.685  76  4.812  3.759  .028 
SSE 190.832  149.129  1.280     
SST 569.633  227.091  12.776     
FOR‐DEC>SHOR
FOR‐DEC>PASS
 
 
Scenario 3: Response Selection Decision 
The highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics by participants was for FOR-DEC 
followed by DESIDE, PASS, and SHOR (Table 2).  There were significant differences among the 
rated overall suitability of the four ADM mnemonics in this scenario（F=14.63, P<.000）.  Further 
comparisons using post-hoc t-tests showed significant differences between FOR-DEC (M=7.43, 
SD=1.10) vs SHOR (M=6.59, SD=1.14) ; FOR-DEC(M=7.43, SD=1.10) vs PASS (M=6.81, SD=1.03) ; 
and FOR-DEC(M=7.43, SD=1.10) vs DESIDE (M=6.99, SD=1.21) in table 5. 
 
Table 5: One‐way ANOVA table for Response Selection scenario broken down by   
the four different ADM mnemonics 
Source  SS  DF  MS  F  P  Post‐Hoc 
SStr 30.296  3  10.099  14.637  .000 
SSb 235.322  78  3.017  4.372  .007 
SSE 161.443  234  .690     
SST 427.061  315  13.806     
FOR‐DEC>SHOR 
FOR‐DEC>PASS 
FOR‐DEC>DESIDE 
 
 
 
Scenario 4: Resource Management Decision  
The highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics in the resource management 
decision-making scenario by participants was FORDEC followed by DESIDE, SHOR, and PASS 
(Table 2).  There were no significant differences in the ratings of suitability among the four ADM 
mnemonics（F=2.639, P>.05）in table 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: One‐way ANOVA for Resource Management scenario broken down by 
the four different ADM mnemonics 
Source  SS  DF  MS  F  P  Post‐Hoc
SStr 7.833  2.120  3.695  2.639  .071 
SSb 368.648  76  4.851  3.465  .034 
SSE 225.542  161.106  1.400     
SST 602.023  239.226  9.946     
NS 
 
Scenario 5: Non-diagnostic Procedural Decision 
The highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics by participants was FOR-DEC 
followed by DESIDE, PASS, and SHOR (Table 2).  There were significant differences among the 
rated overall suitability of the four ADM mnemonics in this scenario（F=20.494， P<.000）.  Further 
comparisons using post-hoc t-tests showed significant differences between FOR-DEC (M=7.50, 
SD=1.14) vs SHOR (M=6.47, SD=1.31) ; FOR-DEC (M=7.50, SD=1.14) vs PASS (M=6.72, 
SD=1.11) ; and FOR-DEC (M=7.50, SD=1.14) vs DESIDE (M=7.08, SD=1.09) in table 7. 
 
Table 7: One‐way ANOVA for Non‐diagnostic Procedural scenario broken down by 
  the four different ADM mnemonics 
Source  SS  DF  MS  F  P  Post‐Hoc 
SStr 45.491  2.183  20.840  20.494  .000 
SSb 253.880  76  3.341  3.285  .039 
SSE 168.696  165.896  1.017     
SST 468.067  244.079  25.198     
FOR‐DEC>SHOR 
FOR‐DEC>PASS 
FOR‐DEC>DESIDE
 
 
Scenario 6: Problem-solving Decision 
The highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics by participants was FOR-DEC 
followed by DESIDE, PASS, and SHOR (Table 2).  There were significant differences among the 
rated overall suitability of the four ADM mnemonics in this scenario（F=3.379， P<.032）.  Further 
comparisons using post-hoc t-tests showed significant differences between FOR-DEC (M=7.50, 
SD=1.14) vs PASS (M=6.72, SD=1.11) in table 8. 
 
Table 8: One‐way ANOVA for Problem‐solving scenario broken down by 
  the four different ADM mnemonics 
Source  SS  DF  MS  F  P  Post‐Hoc 
SStr 8.593  2.222  3.867  3.379  .032 
SSb 307.459  75  4.099  3.583  .028 
SSE 190.704  166.655  1.144     
SST 506.756  243.877  9.11     
 
FOR‐DEC>PASS
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
In flight operations, pilots are confronted with many problems that occur in continually changing 
situations that do create certain level of stress and leading to human error accidents.  To make rapid 
decisions, pilots make decisions using a holistic process involving situation recognition and pattern 
matching.  Within this framework, pilots’ situation awareness becomes the driving factor in the 
decision-making process. In general, aviation training organizations do not have specific methods or 
techniques for decision-making instruction during ab-initio training.  The ability to make decisions in 
the air has often been regarded as by-product of flying experience rather than training.  However, the 
data obtained in this research, , suggests that the FOR-DE may be suitable as a basis for providing 
training which will be applicable for covering all six basic types of decision.  FOR-DEC was 
evaluated as being the highest-rated scale for its applicability across six different decision-making 
scenarios.  It was rated as potentially having superior performance compared to the other three 
mnemonic methods (SHOR, PASS & DESIDE) in Go/no go decision, Recognition-primed decisions, 
Response selection decision, Non-diagnostic procedural decision, and Problem-solving decision 
scenarios (Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Summary of rankings of the five ADM mnemonic methods across the six decision making scenarios 
 
    Scenarios 
 
Mnemonics 
Go/no go 
decision 
Recognition-  
primed 
decision 
Response 
selection 
decision 
Resource 
management 
decision 
Non-diagnostic 
procedural 
decision 
Creative 
problem 
-solving 
SHOR 2 4 4 3 4 4 
PASS 4 3 3 4 3 3 
FOR-DEC 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DESIDE 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 
Kaempf & Orasanu (1997) suggested that under conditions of time pressure, decision makers need help 
to determine what is occurring in the environment around them.  Therefore, decision aids and training 
should provide decision makers with the tools and skills necessary to accurately and quickly make 
situation assessments.  FOR-DEC was rated highly for situation assessment, risk management, and 
applicability.  It was thought to be comprehensive and thorough; clear about how to identify the safest 
actions; and it also had a logical order and was easy to remember.  However, it did require much more 
time to perform this analysis and produce a response.  The qualitative data suggest that SHOR was 
regarded by pilots as providing a method for a quick decision-making response in urgent situations 
with a logical order for flight operations safely.  PASS also matched airlines pilots training guidelines 
as it had clear and specific procedures to follow.  DESIDE were regarded as being comprehensive but 
enough time was needed to undertake this method. FOR-DEC was rated as the highest performance of 
all mnemonics.  
 
Pilots advised that practicing FOR-DEC in the simulator was extremely important before attempting to 
apply it in a real life situation. FOR-DEC was rated by cadet pilots as the best ADM mnemonic–based 
decision making method for promoting good resource management decisions as would be expected of a 
methodology originally developed to promote good CRM.  The qualitative data elicited from pilots’ 
showed that FOR-DEC has characteristics to deal with non-urgent situations as a result of its good 
situation assessment and risk management characteristics; it was thought that it prompted a 
comprehensive approach in terms of the number of factors that it encompassed in the decision making 
process; it was regarded as providing a specific and clear approach to analyze a situation and it 
possessed a logical order that was easy to remember.  However, it did require more time to undertake 
the required steps and analyze and respond to the changing situation.  An implication of the fact that 
many decisions must be made under stress is that training should include extensive practice to learn key 
behaviors (Driskell & Salas, 1991).  However, Zakay & Wooler (1984) found that practice without 
time pressure did not enhance decision-making under time constraints.  This suggests that, if 
decision-making is likely to be required under time pressure or other stressful conditions, practice 
should include task performance under those conditions. 
 
SHOR was developed for use in U.S. Air Force tactical command and control scenarios, where 
decisions were likely to be made under high pressure and within severe time constraints.  These 
situations involve making near-real-time decisions involving threat warning and rescheduling, and 
often require dynamic modifications to plans (Wohl, 1981). The contents of SHOR match the 
requirements of the scenarios requiring urgent decisions. As SHOR is basically an extension of the 
stimulus-response (S-R) paradigm of classical behaviourist psychology, it explicitly addresses the 
requirement to deal with two aspects of uncertainty in the decision-making process; information input 
uncertainty (relating to hypothesis generation and evaluation) and consequence-of-action uncertainty 
(which creates the requirement for option generation and evaluation) (Wohl, 1981).  SHOR is able to 
promote quick responses in a time-limited situation and it also corresponds to the basic principles of 
briefing during tactical training. The qualitative data from pilots also revealed that the four steps in 
SHOR fulfilled the requirements to deal with time-limited, urgent situations. It has simple steps with 
high applicability; it is easy to practice and it promotes the logical procedures required for safe action.  
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1988) found that, under time pressure, a number of heuristic choice 
strategies are more useful than attempts to apply a truncated normative model. Subjects adapt their 
decision-making strategies in reasonable ways when placed under time constraints. Under time 
pressure, the likelihood of making serious errors increases.  Decision makers tend to ignore relevant 
information, make risky decisions and perform with less skill (Keinan, 1987). 
 
Pilots consistently selected FOR-DEC as the best mnemonic-based decision making method in the 
go/no go decision, recognition-primed decision, response selection decision, resource management 
decisions, non-diagnostic procedural decision scenarios, and problem-solving decision all of which 
were urgent, potentially high risk, time-critical situations and required prompt actions.  The pilots’ 
comments suggested that FOR-DEC had the required characteristics to deal with urgent situations as it 
promoted quick responses.  It was simple and easy to remember; it fitted the constraints inherent in 
time-limited and critical situations; it matched the general format of a pre-flight briefing; it was easy to 
put into practice; and it was thought that its logical procedures promoted safe action.  The principal 
limitation of the present study was that it only elicited pilots’ opinions about the efficacy of these 
decision-making techniques. As a result, research needs to be undertaken to produce empirical 
performance data to establish if training in the use of ADM mnemonic-based methods such as 
FOR-DEC can actually improve pilots’ in-flight decision-making. There is a raising need for future 
study to justify the effectiveness of ADM training interventions based FOR-DEC mnemonics methods 
across all different types of decision-making scenarios encountered in stress situations.  The cognitive 
processes employed by pilots also need to been investigated in a series of reliable tools.    
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Orasanu (1993) suggested that the six basic types of decisions each impose different demands on the 
decision-maker and require different approaches.  This research suggests that the FOR-DEC 
mnemonic forms a suitable basis for decision-making training that encompass the requirements for 
these six basic decision making situations.  It was rated as being the best ADM mnemonic method in 
critical, urgent situations and was regarded as superior for knowledge-based decisions which required 
more comprehensive considerations.  To optimize the effectiveness of decision-making training, it is 
suggested that it will be necessary to deliver instruction using the FOR-DEC mnemonic-based method.   
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